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Proponemos un enfoque metodológico para modelizar el diseño de políticas 
económicas y obtener recomendaciones prácticas de política basado en la teoría de la 
decisión multicriterio y un modelo económico estructural. En particular, se aplica la 
técnica de Programación Multiobjetivo en combinación con un modelo de equilibrio 
general aplicado, calibrado con datos españoles del año 1995, lo que permite proponer 
el concepto de política eficiente y calcular empíricamente el conjunto de políticas 
eficientes para la economía española. Este enfoque permite cuantificar el “tradeoff” 
entre el crecimiento y la inflación, medir la eficiencia de la política fiscal aplicada en la 
realidad y recomendar algunas modificaciones que pueden aumentar la eficiencia de la 
política económica en la práctica. 
 




We propose to model policy making as a multicriteria problem and solve it using 
suitable multicriteria techniques in connection with some structural economic model to 
represent optimal policy making and to get useful policy recommendations. By using a 
multiobjective approach combined with a Computable General Equilibrium model, we 
propose the concept of efficient policy and calculate the set of efficient policies for the 
Spanish economy in an empirical exercise. This approach allows us to quantify the 
trade-off between growth and inflation, to measure the efficiency of the actually 
applied fiscal policy and to get some plausible modifications that could foster policy 
efficiency in practice. 
Keywords: Public Policy, Multicriteria Decision Making, Efficient Frontier, Computable 
General Equilibrium Model. 





























  The standard approach in economics to model the optimal design of economic 
policy is to assume that a social planner aims at maximising some social welfare 
function, typically the utility function of a representative consumer
1. Although this 
approach is theoretically robust and elegant, it presents some difficulties concerning its 
realism and implement ability in practice. First, as Arrow (1963) showed, it is virtually 
not possible to define a welfare function with reasonable properties to represent the 
preferences of all the society. Second, the maximisation of a single utility function does 
not appear to be consistent with the observed practice in policy making, regarding the 
behaviour of the economic authorities. Rather, it seems to be the case that policy makers 
are concerned about a bundle of economic indicators that represent the state and 
evolution of the economy from a macroeconomic point of view (growth rate, inflation 
rate, unemployment rate, public deficit, public debt, foreign deficit…) and they try to 
design their policies to improve the performance of the economy as measured by these 
indicators. In other words, the government typically faces a decision problem with 
several policy goals and, moreover, these goals usually conflict with each other. For 
example, an active anti-unemployment policy could foster inflation; increasing 
economic growth could be harmful for the foreign sector, and so on. 
The so-called Multicriteria Decision Making (MCDM henceforth) literature has 
been developed specifically to deal with situations in which there are multiple 
conflicting goals. Several particular techniques, such as multiobjective programming, 
compromise programming, goal programming and others, have been fruitfully applied 
to many economic problems in which it is not reasonable or operational to assume the 
existence of a single goal or objective. See Ballestero and Romero (1998) for an 
introduction to multicriteria techniques and their applications to economic problems. 
  In this paper we propose to model policy making as a multicriteria problem for a 
double reason. Firstly, from a conceptual perspective, it seems a sensible way to 
understand and represent the concerns and the procedures actually followed by policy 
makers. Secondly, from an empirical perspective, we argue that MCDM techniques, if 
properly applied, can be of considerable help to get operative policy recommendations 
and, therefore, to decide how to use policy instruments in practice. To elaborate on the 
                                                 





























ssecond argument, we investigate the potentiality of multiobjective programming, which 
is a MCDM technique designed to look for so-called efficient solutions and it can be 
applied to policy making problems to define what we call efficient policies. After 
identifying relevant policy objectives, a policy (i.e., a combination of policy 
instruments) is said to be efficient if there is no other feasible policy that can achieve the 
same of better performance for all the policy objectives being strictly better for at least 
one objective. 
  In the 70’s some authors recognized the multicriteria nature of policy making 
and made some attempts to connect multicriteria techniques with econometric models to 
give policy recommendations (see Spivey and Tamura 1970, Wallenius, Wallenius and 
Vartia 1978, Zeleny and Cochrane 1978). This branch of work did not go very far, 
probably because of the intrinsic limitations of estimated econometric models to predict 
the effect of alternative policies. This limitation was clearly stated in a well-known 
article by Robert Lucas (1976). The main idea is that the parameters estimated from a 
reduced form model reflect a combination of economic agents’ behaviour and the 
prevailing policy framework, so that in order to predict the effects of a different policy, 
it is not suitable to use a reduced form model, and a structural model, specifying 
behaviour functions for all the agents, is needed instead. 
  We propose to use a multicriteria approach connected to a structural economic 
model to approach the design of economic policies. Specifically, we present an 
application using a computable general equilibrium model (CGE model hereafter) 
calibrated for the Spanish economy. Following the CGE tradition, this model performs a 
structural disaggregate representation of the activity sectors in the economy and the 
equilibrium of markets, according to basic microeconomic principles. 
In Section 2, we identify the main elements required to represent optimal policy 
making as a multicriteria problem both in a theoretical and an operational setting. 
Furthermore, we apply the multicriteria concept of efficient solutions in order to define 
efficient policies. In Section 3 we present an application to the Spanish economy using a 
CGE model. We discuss the main features of the model and the database used for the 
calibration and we set up the policy problem to be solved. For the sake of simplicity, we 
focus on a bi-criteria problem (growth vs. inflation) so that we can show a clear 
illustration of the methodology proposed. In Section 4, the most important results are 





























sobserved policy as compared to this frontier. We detect some degree of inefficiency and 
we provide some empirical indications about how policy should be modified in practice 
to become more efficient. It is remarkable that the model recommends some policy 
changes depending on the policy focus but there are also a number of policy 
recommendations that appear to be relevant for the sake of efficiency independently of 
whether the decision makers are primarily concerned about growth or inflation. 
 
2. GENERAL SETTING 
  Assume the government has a vector x of policy instruments which, depending 
on the institutional setting, may include different taxes, public expenditure and 
investment, interest rates, and so on. 
  Economic agents are assumed to act rationally in the sense that they choose the 
values for their decision variables to maximise their objective functions. Consumers 
make consumption and saving decisions to maximise utility and firms decide their 
factor demand and goods supply to maximise profits. Assume there are m economic 
agents in the economy and each agent h (h=1,...,m) has a vector, denoted as zh, of 
decision variables. Agent h decides the value of zh to 
maximise   fh (zh , z-h , x) 
subject to         zh ∈  Rh 
where  Rh is the feasible set for the decision variables of agent h. In general, the 
objective function of agent h,  fh, may depend on his own decisions, the decisions 
(denoted as z-h) of the rest of agents, and the value of the policy variables. For example, 
the profit of a firm depends on its own strategy, the competitors’ strategy, the 
consumers’ behaviour and the taxes they have to pay.  
Let zh(z-h,x) denote the optimal response of agent h, i.e., the (feasible) value of 
his decision variables maximising uh, given the value of z-h and x. Once the value of x is 
fixed, the interaction among agents provides the equilibrium value of all the decision 
variables for all the agents, denoted as  . In equilibrium the 
following conditions must hold: 






































s     z * (x) ∈R 
where R is a set determined by feasibility constraints for the whole economy (in a 
standard economic model, this includes the equality between demand and supply for all 
markets and overall resource constraints). 
  After aggregation of z*, we get the value of the relevant macroeconomic 
variables which are the typical policy objectives (for example, Domestic Growth 
Product results from the aggregation of outputs from all the firms, the Consumer Price 
Index results from the weighted average of the prices of all goods and services, and so 
on). Assume the government is interested on K macroeconomic aggregates denoted as 
Z1, …, ZK, which can be obtained from z* according to some aggregation rules: 
        )) ( ( ≡ x z  Z   Z
*
1 1
...                (2) 
        ) ) ( ( ≡ x z  Z   Z
*
K K
  If a planner knows the response functions of all the agents, using (1) he can 
predict the equilibrium of the economy for every value of x and, using the aggregation 
in (2), he can get the values of the policy objectives as a function of x. If there were a 
single policy objective (K=1), the optimal design of the economic policy would result 
from solving the following problem
2: 
     Z Opt
x
    s. t.   (1), (2) 
   x   ∈ X 
where Opt means the search for optimal solutions in a maximising sense when “more is 
better” (for example, economic growth) or in minimising sense when “less is better” 
(for example, inflation) and X is the feasible set accounting for any constraint on the 
policy variables (for example, fiscal pressure should not be too high, public expenditure 
should not exceed some limit, and so on). Nevertheless there are typically several policy 
                                                 
2 Following standard economic terminology, this policy making process can be interpreted as a game in 
which the planner acts as a leader by playing his strategy in the first stage and the rest of economic agents 
play their optimal responses in a subgame starting in the second stage (a single stage if we adopt a static 





























sobjectives presenting some trade-off between them so that the government faces a 
multicriteria problem when making its policy. Depending on the specific context and 
the aims of the government, this problem could be handled using different techniques 
from those available in the literature (see, for example, Ballestero and Romero 1998). In 
this paper, we illustrate a way to handle policy design using multiobjective 
programming, which is a multicriteria technique aimed at determining efficient 
solutions. In MCDM, a feasible solution is defined as efficient if there is no other 
feasible solution that can achieve the same or better performance for all the criteria 
being strictly better for at least one criterion. In our context, the multiobjective design of 
policies can be represented by the following decision problem: 
    Eff      ] ,...Z [Z     Z K 1 ≡
           s. t.      (1), (2)      (3) 
                     x ∈X 
where Eff means the search for efficient policies. A feasible policy (i.e., a value of x∈X) 
is said to be efficient if it provides some values of the objective variables such that there 
is no feasible policy that can achieve the same of better performance for all the policy 
objectives being strictly better for at least one policy objective. 
  For practical purposes, the implementation of this approach requires the 
following elements: 
1. Identifying the relevant policy goals as measured by economic variables. 
2. Determining the policy instruments and the feasible range for them. 
3. A structural model including behaviour functions for economic agents from which it 
is possible to express the equilibrium of the economy and the value of policy objectives 
as a function of policy instruments. 
4. If, apart from a theoretical exercise, the research aims to be empirically useful, then it 
is also necessary to have a reliable database in order to find the parameter values of the 
model by some estimation of calibration procedure. 
5. Finally, some suitable optimisation tool (typically, implemented in a software) is 






























s3. AN APPLICATION FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
  To implement this approach, firstly we need an economic model to represent the 
economy where the policy is to be applied. We use a CGE model calibrated for the 
Spanish economy in order to have a description of the real world as accurate as possible. 
Secondly, the policy instruments and policy objectives have to be defined. For the sake 
of simplicity, we stick to a bi-criteria setting assuming that the government only cares 
about growth and inflation. This allows us to get clear-cut results, which are easy to 
interpret and to illustrate graphically. A larger number of objectives could be handled in 
a similar way (of course, at the cost of a higher computational burden). 
3.1. The economic model  
We use a CGE model following the basic principles of the walrasian equilibrium 
-as in Scarf and Shoven (1984), Ballard et al. (1985) or Shoven and Whalley (1992)-, 
enlarged by including public and foreign sectors. The activity level of the foreign sector 
is assumed to be exogenous, while the relative prices and the activity levels of all the 
productive sectors are endogenous variables. Taxes and the activity of the public sector 
are taken as exogenous by consumers and firms and they are seen as decision variables 
by the government. A price vector for all goods and inputs, a vector of activity levels, 
and a value for public income give the equilibrium of the economy such that consumers 
maximise their utility, firms maximise their profits (net of taxes), public income equals 
the payments of all economic agents, and supply equals demand in all markets. A very 
similar model has been used for Spain in a regional basis. To save some space, we only 
present the basic features of the model. A more detailed description can be found in 
Cardenete and Sancho (2003) or André, Cardenete and Velázquez (2005). 
The model comprises 9 productive sectors (in order to match the aggregated 
version of the Social Accounting Matrix, see below) with one representative firm in 
each sector, a single representative consumer, one public sector and one foreign sector. 
The production technology is described by a nested production function. The domestic 
output of sector j, measured in euros and denoted by Xdj, is obtained by combining, 
through a Leontief technology, outputs from the rest of sectors and the value added VAj. 
In turn, this value added is generated from primary inputs (labour, L, and capital, K), 
combined by a Cobb-Douglas technology. Overall output of sector j, Qj, is obtained 





























sthe Armington (1969) hypothesis, in which domestic and imported products are taken as 
imperfect substitutes. 
There are 9 different goods –corresponding to productive sectors- and a 
representative consumer who demands present consumption goods and saves the 
remainder of his disposable income after paying taxes. The government raises taxes to 
obtain public revenue R, as well as it gives transfers to the private sector, TPS, and 
demands goods and services GDj from each sector j=1,…,9.  PD denotes the final 
balance (surplus or deficit) of the public budget:  




- -  
cpi being the Consumer Price Index and pj a production price index before Value Added 
Tax (VAT hereafter) referring to all goods produced by sector j. The Consumer Price 
Index is calculated as a weighted average of the prices of all sectors, according to the 
participation of each one in the overall production of the economy. 
Consumer disposable income (YD henceforth) equals labour and capital income, 
plus transfers, minus direct taxes: 
YD=  w L + r K + cpi TPS +TROW -  DT (r K + cpi TPS +TROW) 
- DT (w L - WC w L) - WC w L 
where w and r denote input (labour and capital) prices and L and K input quantities sold 
by the consumer, TROW represents transfers received by the consumer from the rest of 
the world, DT is the tax rate of the Income Tax (IT hereafter) and WC the tax rate 
corresponding to the payment of the employees to Social Security (ESS hereafter). The 
consumer’s objective is to maximise his welfare, subject to his budget constraint. 
Welfare is obtained from consumption goods CDj ( j = 1,…,9) and savings SD, -
according to a Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
YD   SD   p CD p                         s.t.





















    





























sRegarding investment and saving, this is a saving driven model. The closure rule 
is defined in such a way that investment is exogenous, savings are determined from the 
consumer’s decision and both variables are related with the public and foreign sectors 
by the following identity, where INVj denotes investment in sector j: 




inv inv j ROWD PD p SD p INV   
Labour and capital demands are computed under the assumption that firms 
minimise the cost of producing value added. In the capital market we consider that 
supply is perfectly inelastic. For labour supply, we use the following approach, which 
shows a feedback between the real wage and the unemployment rate, related to the 
















     
where u and u are the unemployment rates in the simulation and in the benchmark 
equilibrium respectively, w/cpi is the real wage and β is a flexibility parameter. For the 
empirical exercises, we take an estimated value for Spain from the econometric 
literature:  β =1.25 (Andrés et al. 1990). Gross Domestic Product (GDP hereafter) is 
calculated from the expenditure point of view, as the aggregation of private 
consumption, investment, public expenditure and net exports. 
 
3.2. Databases and calibration 
The main data used in this paper come from the aggregated 1995
4 social 
accounting matrix for Spain (SAM hereafter, see Cardenete and Sancho 2004 for the 
technical details about the construction of this matrix). The SAM comprises 21 
accounts, including 9 productive sectors as shown in Table 1
5, two inputs (labour and 
capital), a saving/investment account, a government account, direct taxes (IT and ESS) 
                                                 
3 This formulation is consistent with an institutional setting where the employers decide the amount of 
labour demanded and workers decide real wage taking into account the unemployment rate: if labour 
demand increases (decreases), the unemployment rate u decreases (increases) and workers demand higher 
(lower) real wages. If, after the simulation, employment remains unchanged, the real wage is the same as 
in the benchmark equilibrium. (see Kehoe et al. (1995)). 
4 The latest symmetric input-output table (from which the SAM is built) officially available at this 
moment in Spain is the one of 1995. 
5 A more disaggregate version is available but we decided to stick to this simpler version since we do not 





























sand indirect taxes (VAT, payroll tax, output tax and tariffs), a foreign sector and a 
representative consumer.  
The numerical values for the parameters in the model are obtained by the usual 
procedure of calibration (see, for example, Mansur and Whalley, 1984). Specifically, 
the following parameters are calibrated: all the technical coefficients of the production 
functions, all the tax rates and the coefficients of the utility function. The calibration 
criterion is that of reproducing the 1995 SAM as an initial equilibrium for the economy, 
which is used as a benchmark for all the simulations. In such an equilibrium, all the 
prices and the activity levels are set equal to one, so that, after the simulation, it is 
possible to observe directly the change rate of relative prices and activity levels. When 
finding the economic equilibrium corresponding to the policies combinations obtained 
from the optimisation exercises, the wage is taken as numeraire (w = 1) and the rest of 
prices are allowed to vary as required to meet equilibrium conditions. 
 
3.3. Policy variables, policy objectives and efficient policies 
  We focus on fiscal policy and we take as policy variables ( x) the public 
expenditure in each activity sector (gj)
6 and the average tax rates applied to every 
economic sector, including indirect taxes: Social Security contributions paid by 
employers (ECj), Tariffs (Tj), Value Added Tax (VATj); and direct taxes: Social Security 
contributions paid by employees (Wj) and Income Tax (TD). Concerning the feasible set 
for these policy variables (X) we impose the following constraints to give some realism 
to the exercise: 
-  We take as a benchmark the values of public expenditure and tax rates observed 
in the SAM and obtained in the calibration procedure. We restrict all the policy 
variables to vary less than twenty percent with respect to their values in the 
benchmark situation (denoted as x0):  
0.8  ≤ 0 x  x ≤1.2    0 x
-  Furthermore, to avoid obtaining policies that could affect drastically the public 
budget, we impose the constraint that both the overall tax revenue and the 
                                                 
6 In the SAM for Spain, the Government expenditure only appears to be positive in sectors 5, 6 and 9 





























soverall public expenditure must be equal to their values in the benchmark 
situation. 
   We assume that there are only two relevant policy objectives (K = 2), namely 
to maximise economic growth (γ) and to minimise inflation (π). Economic growth is 
calculated by the annual rate of change of GDP and inflation is measured by the annual 














were the subscript denotes the year. The values of GDP and cpi for 1994 are 
exogenously given
7 and the values for 1995 are equilibrium values endogenously 
determined in the optimisation exercises. 
  A specific policy combination x providing the objective values K=(γ,π) is then 
an efficient policy if there is not any feasible policy x’ providing K’=(γ',π ') such that γ’ 




  As it is common in MCDM exercises, the first step is to asses the degree of 
conflict between the relevant policy objectives by computing the so-called payoff 
matrix. This is made by optimising each objective separately –in this case, maximising 
growth and minimising inflation
9- and then computing the value of each objective at 
each of the optimal solutions. Table 2 displays the results from these calculations. The 
first row shows the values of growth and inflation obtained from the growth 
maximisation exercise and the second row the values of the same variables obtained 
when minimising inflation. 
As common macroeconomic intuition suggest, we conclude that there is a strong 
conflict between both objectives: by implementing a suitable policy, it would be 
possible to obtain a growth rate equal to 3.62 at the cost of having an inflation rate of 
6.59 %. Similarly, the lowest feasible inflation, -6.76 % would imply a negative growth 
                                                 
7 Source: INE (Spanish Statistical Institute). 
8 All the calculations are made using GAMS software. 
9 Since GDP1994 and cpi1994 are given, maximising γ and minimising π is the same as maximising GDP1995 





























srate equal to -9.69 %. The set of values in the main diagonal (the maximum growth rate 
and the minimum inflation rate) is known as ideal point. The vector with the worst 
element of each row (in this case, the minimum growth rate and the maximum inflation 
rate) is called anti-ideal or nadir point. 
The second step is to construct (an approximation of) the efficient set of policies. 
The difficulty to obtain this set crucially depends on the size of the problem and, 
specifically, on the number of objectives. In our case, since we focus on bi-criteria 
problems, it is relatively easy to construct the efficient set using the so-called constraint 
method (initially proposed by Marglin, 1967) in the following way: we make a grid for 
the feasible values of π, from π= -6.76 to π=6.59. The resolution needed for the grid 
depends on the problem at hand. In our case, ten values appeared to be enough to get a 
good approximation to the efficient set. Let πn (n = 1, …, 10) denote one specific value 
of π in the grid. For each one of these values we solve the problem max γ subject to the 
constraint π π ≤ n and all the equations in the model. This procedure is similar to the one 
proposed by Markowitz (1952, 1959) to construct mean-variance frontiers in finance. 
Figure 1 shows the result of this process as well as the ideal point and nadir point for the 
Spanish economy in the year 1995. It can be seen that, in the set of efficient policies, 
there is a monotonic relationship between economic growth and inflation but the trade-
off between both rates, as measured by the slope of the frontier, is not constant. Since 
the frontier results to be strictly convex, if the government tries to get higher and higher 
growth rates (i.e., moving to the right), this will come at an increasing cost in terms of 
stronger upwards shifts in the inflation rate. 
 
Testing the efficiency of observed policies 
  Calculating the set of efficient policies for a specific economy in a given period 
(in our case, Spain, 1995) provides an interesting possibility: the observed rates of 
growth and inflation, which can be understood as the result of the policy actually 
implemented by the government, can be compared to the efficient combinations in order 
to determine to what extent the economic policy followed by the government can be 
considered as efficient in terms of the objectives. Furthermore, by making a projection 
of the observed values on the frontier we can get some clues about how the policy 





























s  In the case under study, we observe the following values for the growth rate and 
the inflation rate in Spain during the year 1995
10: γ = 2.71 %, π = 4.3 %. These values 
are represented by point O in Figure 2, which is a convenient amplification of the 
relevant part of Figure 1. Since this point lies strictly to the northwest of the efficient 
frontier, we conclude that the observed policy displays some degree of inefficiency 
because there are some feasible policies that would provide combinations of growth and 
inflation that dominate the observed combinations. Note that point H  provides the same 
inflation rate with a strictly higher growth rate (specifically, γH=3.02, πH=4.3) and point 
V, in turn, provides the same growth rate with a strictly lower inflation rate (γV=2.71, 
πV=3.15). Finally, if we move to a point like D, we get a strictly higher growth rate with 
a strictly lower inflation rate (γV=2.85, πV=3.63). 
From this exercise we can get some information about promising directions for 
the fine-tuning of economic policy. Table 3 shows the value of the policy instruments in 
the observed situation (resulting from the calibration), in point H (“horizontal 
projection”) and point V (“vertical projection”). The former is obtained by maximising γ 
subject to π≤4.3 (the observed value of inflation) and the latter by minimising π subject 
to γ≥2.71 (the observed value of growth).  
  Depending on the preferences of the government, the policy strategy could be 
somehow modified to move towards points H, V or D (or any other on the efficient 
frontier) but, in any case, if any of these combinations are attainable, it is not rational to 
choose point O instead.  
It is worthwhile to remark the similarities and differences between both 
projections. Since point H is the result of maximising growth (while restricting 
inflation) and V is the result of minimising inflation (while restricting growth), one 
could expect to get dramatically different policy strategies in each case. Nevertheless, as 
it can be seen in Table 3, although there are some policy variables that move differently 
in both exercises, there are many of them displaying exactly the same behaviour in both 
cases. Therefore, we can split the set of policy recommendations in two groups: firstly, 
one group of policy changes that appear to be beneficial for efficiency regardless of 
whether the priority of the government is to foster economic growth or to reduce 
inflation, which we label as general efficiency recommendations, and secondly a set of 
                                                 





























spolicy changes that depend on the preferences of the government concerning policy 
objectives. We label them as objective-specific recommendations. 
In the first group (general efficiency) we can highlight that the model 
recommends to increase the public sector expenditure on goods from sectors 5 
(Chemicals) and 6 (Machinery and transport) and to reduce that of goods from sector 9 
(Services). Concerning VAT, the tax rates should decrease for sectors 1 to 4 and 9 and 
to increase for sectors 5, 6 and 8. The Social Security contribution paid by employees 
and that paid by employers in sectors 1 to 4 should unambiguously decrease, whereas 
that paid by employers should increase in sectors 6, 8 and, to a smaller extent, in sector 
7. As a general comment, the model seems to suggest that taxation should be alleviated 
in less productive sectors (Agriculture, Extractives, Energy or Food) or those generating 
a lower valued added (Services) and increased in dynamic sectors such as Machinery 
and transport or Construction. 
The shadowed cells show the objective-specific policy recommendations, i.e., 
the policy variables that should be modified in a different way for a growth-maximising 
strategy and for an inflation-minimising strategy. The differences between both 
strategies appear to be rather small as compared with their common features. The 
clearest differences arise in the Social Security contribution paid by Employers in 
sectors 5 and 9 that should be higher to increase growth and lower to reduce inflation. 
Something similar happens with the indirect tax on consumption (VAT) in sector 7. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  We have argued that the process of designing optimal policies can be suitably 
understood as a multicriteria decision problem from the point of view of the 
government. Consequently, we propose to use multicriteria techniques in connection 
with some structural modelling strategy for the economy in order to get a realistic 
picture of this decision process and sensible recommendations to improve the efficient 
use of policy instruments in practice. 
  Multiobjective programming allows us to define efficient policies with respect to 
given policy goals and, combining this tool with a suitable economic model, it is also 





























smodel is an adequate complement for this exercise because it rests on a structural 
definition of agents’ behaviour. 
A CGE model properly calibrated for the Spanish economy allows us to quantify 
the trade-off between growth and inflation when designing fiscal policy. Furthermore, 
possible inefficiency of the policy currently applied can be detected and we can get 
some recommendations about lines for improving the policy mix. It is remarkable that a 
number of policy changes seem to be relevant for the sake of efficiency independently 
of the weight given to growth and inflation by the policy makers. 
Some limitations and plausible ways to extend this analysis should also be 
remarked. Firstly, the analytical model suggests which policy changes could be 
beneficial for the economy, including the policy instruments that should change and the 
directions for these changes. In practice, it could be difficult to follow strictly these 
recommendations because of financial and institutional rigidities. In any case, we claim 
that this kind of information could be interesting for the government as an orientation, 
even if it is not possible to be fully applied. Secondly, note that the definition of 
efficient policies is essentially determined by the selection of policy objectives. 
Therefore, what appears to be an inefficient policy relative to a set of objectives could 
be efficient when evaluated with different criteria. For example, we identify some 
degree of inefficiency in the Spanish fiscal policy assuming that policy objectives are 
basically represented by economic growth and inflation. Considering different 
objectives such as employment, environmental impact or international convergence 
could give totally different results concerning the efficiency or inefficiency of policy. 
An immediate extension of this work consists of widening the set of policy objectives 
and analysing policy decisions under alternative combinations of those objectives. 
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sTable 1: Productive sectors in SAM 
Nº Name 
1  Agriculture, cattle, forestry and fishing
2 Extractives 
3 Energy  and  Water 
4 Food 
5 Chemicals 




Source: Cardenete and Sancho (2004) 
 
Table 2. Pay-off matrix 
  γ Econ. growth (%)  π Inflation (%) 
Max γ  3.62  6.59 
Min π  -9.69  -6.76 


































sTable 3. Policy variables (observed and projected) 
  Point H  Point V 










5  3295 3954 20.00 3954 20.00
6  119 143 20.00 143 20.00 Public expenditure 
9  80362 79679 -0.85 79679 -0.85
1  0.65 0.52 -20.0 0.52 -20.0
2  1.30 1.04 -20.0 1.04 -20.0
3  3.29 2.63 -20.0 2.63 -20.0
4  2.28 1.82 -20.0 1.82 -20.0
5  1.02 1.22 20.0 1.22 20.0
6  1.42 1.71 20.0 1.71 20.0
7  1.89 2.26 19.5 1.86  -1.7
8  1.70 2.04 20.0 2.04 20.0
VAT 
9  3.61 2.89 -20.0 2.89 -20.0
1  11.17 8.94 -20.0 8.94 -20.0
2  39.64 31.72 -20.0 31.72 -20.0
3  36.22 28.98 -20.0 28.98 -20.0
4  27.28 21.83 -20.0 21.83 -20.0
5  32.33 32.73 1.2 29.57  -8.5
6  28.52 34.23 20.0 34.23 20.0
7  25.58 28.05 9.6 26.70  4.4




9  26.60 27.44 3.2 24.84  -6.6
1  0.15 0.15 0.0 0.15 0.0
2  0.11 0.11 0.0 0.11 0.0
4  0.57 0.56 -1.75 0.57  0.0
5  0.56 0.66 17.85 0.56  0.0
6  1.62 1.62 0.0 1.59  -2.2
Tariffs 
7  0.89 0.89 0.0 0.89 0.0
Income Tax    10.29 10.75 4.5 11.47  11.5
Soc. Sec. Employees    6.50 5.17 -20.5 5.17 -20.5
Source: own elaboration. Units: 
(a) Million euros for Public Expenditure and per cent average rates for 
taxes; 
(b) per cent rate of change with respect to the observed value. 
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